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Guido Cozzi
Abstract
This paper shows that standard Schumpeterian theory does not imply that the incumbent mo-
nopolist has too little incentive to carry out R&D aimed at displacing its own product. If the patent
holder is rational as is any other R&D investor, she will know that in equilibrium her patent’s
obsolescence shall not be affected by her own R&D investment, because all the R&D firms op-
erate under perfect competition and constant returns to scale at the private level. This reconciles
Schumpeterian theory with the empirical evidence on innovation by incumbents. It is proved that
the usual macroeconomic implications maintain their validity.
KEYWORDS: Arrow effect, basic Schumpeterian model, R&D and growth, innovation by in-
cumbents
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Sapienza” and at the Catholic University of Milan for comments. I am indebted to two Referees
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1. Introduction
In virtually all Schumpeterian growth models with vertical innovation it is
claimed that an outsider research and development (R&D) firm has a higher
incentive to undertake quality improving R&D than the current patent holder.
In fact, when considering R&D investment, the incumbent monopolist would
internalize its monopoly right’s obsolescence and therefore would subtract its
current value from the payoﬀ of successful innovation1. As a result, the suc-
cessful patent holder that temporarily monopolizes each product line will never
be the same firm: the incumbent monopolists rest on their laurels in order to
avoid to cannibalize themselves.
It is well known that such a drastic theoretical implication is at odd with
real world evidence, in which firms tend to possess patent rights on products
that rendered obsolete their previous products: this prediction is tradition-
ally viewed as the main flaw of Schumpeterian growth theory (Aghion and
Howitt 1992, Grossman and Helpman 1991, Segerstrom 1998, etc.), otherwise
rich in important insights on the macroeconomics of growth, general equilib-
rium innovation, and the political economy of international competition. For
example, Malerba and Orsenigo (1999), study the patents granted to firms
in 1978-1991 in important countries, showing that the percentage of patents
granted to firms that had already innovated within their sector was 70% in
Germany, 60% in France, 57% in Great Britain, 39% in Italy, 68% in the USA,
and 62% in Japan. According to the authors, the percentage of patents granted
to firms that innovated for the first time in the sector was 15% in Germany,
24% in France, 24% in Great Britain, 42% in Italy, 18.4% in the USA, and
16% in Japan. The remaining fractions of patents granted in the period in
each country accrued to the (often large) firms which had already innovated
in other sectors (lateral diversification). Hence, the evidence points to a quite
mixed scenario, in which the incumbents seem to dominate innovation in a
seemingly irregular way. This and similar evidence seem strongly at odds with
the clearcut implication - no R&D by incumbents - traditionally ascribed to
the basic Schumpeterian theory.
Several important models - e.g. Barro and Sala—I-Martin (1995), Stein
(1997), Segerstrom and Zolnierek (1999), Denicolo’ (2001), Etro2 (2004) and
Segerstrom (2006) - have been introducing additional assumptions into the
1See for example Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1998) and Barro
and Sala-I-Martin (2004).
2Which refers to a working paper version of this article (p. 298, footnote 22) and recog-
nizes the validity of its result under constant returns to scale R&D technologies. Section 3
will show how my result continues to hold with decreasing returns to scale in the innovation
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Schumpeterian growth framework in order to predict positive equilibriumR&D
by the incumbents. This line of research cast light on important industrial
features (incumbent’s distribution channels, better R&D experience/ability
by the previous patent holder, incumbent’s visibility and Stackelberg R&D
leadership) that considerably extended Schumpeterian growth theory. Clearly,
in order to reconcile the theoretical predictions with a seemingly patternless
evidence, one would need to introduce a lot of heterogeneity in the assumed
leaders’ cost advantages and visibility.
In this paper I claim that even the original Aghion and Howitt’s (1992)
basic Schumpeterian economy was not at odd with the available empirical ev-
idence because it did not predict that in a dynamic general equilibrium with
perfectly competitive R&D sectors no innovation should be carried out by the
incumbent. The reason is very simple and applies to all Schumpeterian equi-
librium growth models whereby product quality, respectively unit production
cost, undertake upward, respectively downward, jumps as a consequence of
purposeful R&D by profit seeking frms in perfectly competitive R&D markets.
If any outsider can run the R&D technology at the same eﬃciency level as the
incumbent and if there are increasing marginal costs of R&D at the sectorial
level but constant returns at the individual level, then a perfectly competitive
incumbent is a price taker, not a quantity taker: outsiders’ R&D level is not
known before the incumbent’s. Theoretically speaking, as each R&D frm size
is indeterminate, the Walrasian auctioneer will select prices only for consistent
individual participations to the unique amount of total R&D that clears the
labor market. Hence given everybody’s optimal strategy, at the equilibrium
prices the incumbent is indiﬀerent on its own R&D investment.
According to my analysis, the basic Schumpeterian model laid down by
Aghion and Howitt (1992) exactly replicates the most irregular evidence: if
leaders are indiﬀerent, we should expect for their participation to R&D all
sorts of patterns. Paradoxically, as a consequence of the interpretation of
the Arrow eﬀect suggested by this paper, it is if leaders have research and
distribution advantages that we should make more drastic preditions, perhaps
conflicting with the data.
Our result can be readily extended to a multisector framework. Instead,
it does not apply to an alternative framework such as Aghion et al (2001)
in which, as in Reinganum (1983), R&D inputs are firm specific. In CRS
cases where all R&D inputs are freely tradeable and there are industry-specific
limitational factors, the potential entrants uniquely pin down the amount of
R&D investment targeting any particular product line, thereby pegging the
sectors and price (i.e. perfect) competition.
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incumbent’s obsolescence. The incumbent’s R&D choice then amounts to the
choice of how many tickets to buy of a fair lottery whose odds are independent
of its R&D decision.
2. The Arrow Eﬀect and Basic Schumpeterian Growth
To help dissipate almost two decades of incorrect interpretation of the Arrow
eﬀect in general equilibrium models with perfectly competitive R&D, I think it
is useful to the reader to put my argument in the simplest possible perspective.
For this reason, the reader is invited to tolerate the following "prelude" that
tries to cast a bridge between the elementary microeconomic theory of perfectly
competitive industries and Schumpeterian R&D and growth theory.
2.1. Prelude: a Simple Perfectly Competitive Industry
Let us assume an industry having a perfectly competitive structure. Each
firm, in continuous time, at any instant τ ≥ 0 can produce an amount λ > 0
of output flow by employing one unit of flow labor under constant returns to
scale. There is free entry and exit. The market price of each unit of output
is constant and denoted3 p ≡ Vt+1At+1 . Moreover, assume that, the unique input
employed, labor, is oﬀered - in amounts n ≥ 0 - to this industry as an increasing
function
n = S(ω) ≡ L− ex(ω)
of wage ω > 0, with ex0(ω) < 0. This would generate the upward sloping labor
supply curve depicted in Figure 1.
3For reasons to be clarified later.
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Figure 1 
Labor Market Equilibrium in a Perfectly Competitive Industry 
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We can invert the labor supply function by writing ω = S(−1)(n), with
S(−1)0(n) > 0 at all levels of n. As shown in Figure 1, the equilibrium em-
ployment level will be equal the unique number, nt, such that the value of the
marginal product of labor is equal to wage, that is:
λ
Vt+1
At+1
= S(−1)(nt) ≡ ωt. (2.1)
Hence the unique industry-wide equilibrium employment level is equal to
nt = S(λ
Vt+1
At+1
) ≡ L− ex(λ Vt+1At+1 ).
This of course leaves the firm size indeterminate, as well as the number of
firms. Let N denote the equilibrium number of operating firms and ni, i =
1, 2, ..., N their positive employment levels, with
PN
i=1 n
i = nt. What would
happen if one of these firms, say firm 1, decides to hire fewer workers? Would
this lead to a decrease in aggregate equilibrium employment? Microeconomic
theory tells us that it will not, otherwise the real wage would become lower
than the value of the marginal product of labor. What would happen if one
of the firm, say firm 1, decides to hire more workers? Would this lead to
an increase in aggregate equilibrium employment? Microeconomic theory tells
us that it will not - unless firm 1 hires more than nt labor units - because
otherwise the real wage would become higher than the value of the marginal
product of labor.
Let us now assume that, for some reason, the owner of one and only one of
the firms, say firm 1, dislikes this industry’s total employment: for example,
assume that B(n) is the pecuniary equivalent of its disutility and that its
expected profit can be written as π1(n1, n) ≡
³
λ Vt+1At+1 − ωt
´
n1 − B(n), with
B0(n) < 0 for all n ≥ 0. Notice that n1 is firm 1’s choice variable, whereas
n is the aggregate employment level in this industry, capturing the negative
externality of industry-wide employment on firm 1. In this environment, firm
1’s optimal quantity decision on n1 is taken at the equilibrium prices of all
outputs and inputs, that is knowing that ω = ωt and therefore that n = nt,
unless it decides to gain monopsonistic power, which happens if it decides to
drive the other firms out of the market by employing n > nt. Let us remind
the reader that nt is a real number, not a variable, for all choices of n1 ≤ nt.
Therefore the industry remains perfectly competitive as long as n ≤ nt. In
such a perfectly competitive industry, by its choice of n1 firm 1 knows it would
5
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not aﬀect nt and thereby B(nt). Therefore we can write:
d
dn1
π1(n1, n) =
(
λ Vt+1At+1 − ωt −B
0(nt) dntdn1 = λ
Vt+1
At+1
− S(−1)(nt) = 0, if n1 ≤ nt
λ Vt+1At+1 − S
(−1)(n1)− S(−1)0(n1)n1 −B0(n1) < 0, if n1 > nt.
.
As a consequence:
Lemma 2.1. a. The unique perfectly competitive equilibrium will prevail
with wage ωt and employment level nt safisfying eq. (2.1).
b. Firm 1 gains zero profits in equilibrium, by optimally employing any
amount of flow labor n1 ∈ [0, nt].
Remark. Notice that this result is valid no matter how "large" firm 1 is in
other markets - provided it holds no monopsonistic power on the same input
- and regardless of how "large" firm 1 might wish to be in this industry. Also
notice that ωt is viewed by firm 1 as a constant as long as n1 ≤ nt, just because
ωt = S(−1)(nt), and n = nt for n1 ≤ nt. This suggests that perceived dntdn1 does
not allow firm 1 to internalize the negative externality B(n) as well as, for any
perfectly competing firm in this industry, the negative pecuniary externality
S(−1)(n).
Do we really need the constant returns to scale assumption for our ex-
ternality irrelevance result to hold? What if instead we had deviations from
constant returns, but they were entirely external to the firms? That would
amount to assuming that the private productivity λ depended on aggregate
n. If λ(n) were decreasing or relatively slightly increasing, the equilibrium
industry employment level would still be given, implicitly, by
nt = L− ex ∙λ(nt) Vt+1At+1
¸
.
Therefore, decreasing returns to scale at the industry level or suﬃciently mild
increasing returns, provided their are external to the firm - a necessary re-
quirement of perfect competition - would not alter our result.
2.2. Introducing Incumbent’s R&D
In the simplest version of the pioneering Aghion and Howitt’s (1992 and 1998)
basic Schumpeterian model with drastic innovations, an infinite number of
6
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perfectly competitive firms produce, at each instant of a continuous and un-
bounded time horizon, a unique non-storable final consumer output flow, yt,
according to the following production function:
yt = AtxαtM
1−α
where xt is the flow of generation t = 0, 1, 2, ...intermediate product, which
is sold monopolistically by the holder of its patent, who produces it on a one-
to-one basis from skilled labor, whose inelastically supplied aggregate amount
is equal to L. Moreover, M denotes manufacturing specific unskilled labor,
whose aggregate amount is normalized to 1. Index At is the productivity level
associated to the t-th intermediate good, and 0 < α < 1.
Perfectly competitive R&D firms hire skilled labor flow and produce a
probability intensity of inventing the t + 1st generation of the intermediate
good, with associated productivity parameter At+1 = γAt, with γ > 1. The
assumed constant returns to scale (CRS) R&D technology transforms one flow
unit of research labor into λ > 0 flow probability of innovation. As soon as
a new good is invented it gets immediately patented and produced by the
unique patent holder, who then enjoys unconstrained monopoly profits; in
fact the quality jump γ is here assumed high enough to render unconvenient
for the previous patent holder to produce when the top quality patent holder
sets profit maximizing prices4.
Standard arguments prove that the intermediate good monopolist’s profit
flows are πt = Atπ (wt/At), where wt is the wage rate of the skilled labor
and π (·) gives productivity-adjusted profit, πt/At, as a decreasing function
of productivity-adjusted wage wt/At ≡ ωt. Optimal intermediate output is
xt = ex(ωt), with ex0 < 0. This implies that the skilled labor market clearing
condition is:
L = ex(ωt) + nt, (L)
where nt is the mass of labor employed in the R&D and L is the total supply
of skilled labor.
The financial arbitrage between consumer loans and firm bonds and equi-
ties, viewed as perfect substitutes implies that the annuity value of the firm
stock, Vt, in case of liquidation be equal to the dividend per unit time plus
4This is a case of "drastic innovation". For low enough quality jumps innovation is
"non-drastic". It is easy to prove that our results are valid also in such a case.
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expected capital gains or losses5 per unit time, that is
rVt = Atπ (ωt)− λntVt,
that is:
Vt =
Atπ (ωt)
r + λnt
.
When an R&D firm hires a flow labor unit its output will be a flow prob-
ability λ > 0 of discovering the t+ 1st patent, which is worth
Vt+1 =
At+1π (ωt+1)
r + λnt+1
This framework fits the previous subsection’s perfectly competitive indus-
try, after interpreting labor average and marginal product of labor, λ, as the
usual output flow in patent race models: the probability per unit time of in-
venting the relevant patentable idea (an immaterial good). The market value
of each unit of that probability flow is exactly Vt+1, that is the present expected
value of the monopolistic rents generated by the intellectual property of the
t+1st intermediate good. Moreover, firm 1 is the incumbent monopolist - i.e.
the owner of the patent on intermediate good t - and B(n) is the expected loss
of value of its current patent in productivity adjusted terms, that is λn VtAt+1 .
The previous subsection’s analysis applies and therefore we can say that
perfect competition in the research sector yields Aghion and Howitt’s (1992)
and (1998, ch. 2) well known R&D arbitrage condition:
ωt = λ
Vt+1
At+1
=
λγπ (ωt+1)
r + λnt
, (A)
where r > 0 is the real rate of time preference in the linear instantaneous
utility functional of the consumer.
The labor market clearing condition and the R&D arbitrage condition allow
to completely describe the dynamics of this economy.
The R&D arbitrage condition shall hold because each skilled labor unit
- owned by each zero measure individual - has the option of working in the
manufacturing sector or of self-employing herself in the R&D sector. In fact,
the constant returns to scale R&D technology mapping flow labor into the flow
5In this model with infinite intertemporal elasticity of substitution it can be proved that
there cannot exist equilibria with non-zero deterministic capital appreciation or depreciation.
This is why only obsolescence is considered.
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probabilities of the development of the next generation of the intermediate
good in proportion to λ > 0 is available to everybody. Hence there is no way
for any firm to prevent the R&D workers from appropriating the full value of
their marginal products.
Given productivity-adjusted real wage ωt > ex(−1)(L)6, the amount of
skilled labor will be inelastically supplied to the R&D sector.
The R&D labor demand side is guided by an indeterminate number of
potential employers: since R&D technology can be operated at zero entrepre-
neurial cost every agent - consumer, worker, non-human organization unit -
can run a "firm", raise funds, and hire the available skilled workers. Hence
each such firm must earn zero profits.
The perfect competition assumption rules out the possibility of any agree-
ment between market participants - be they R&D firms, skilled workers, or
financial intermediaries - to aﬀect aggregate employment and wage. More-
over, there exist no firm-specific factors: all relevant factors are freely tradable
within the industry. If non-tradable firm-specific factors were assumed, our
results would change, as in Aghion et al.’s (2001) investigation of the eﬀects
of large firms on growth.
What would happen in this framework if the current monopolist hired
some R&D workers? In particular what would happen if a positive mass nMt
no larger than nt of skilled workers were hired by the intermediate good firm
that monopolizes the production of the leading-edge intermediate good? This
paper claims that equations (L) and (A) would simply have to be rewritten as
L = ex(ωt) + nOt + nMt ,
and
ωt =
λγπ (ωt+1)
r + λ
¡
nOt+1 + n
M
t+1
¢ ,
where nOt denotes the mass of skilled workers hired by the outsider R&D firms.
It is important to remark the aspects of the basic Schumpeterian model that
are crucial to my argument. The research sector and the capital markets are
perfectly competitive: therefore the current intermediate good monopolist has
no market power in the R&D labor and financial markets. This implies that
neither the intermediate monopolist firm nor any of its shareholders perceive
any ability to aﬀect aggregate R&D. Consequently the current leading-edge
product obsolescence is taken as given and as independent of any individual
6To get non-trivial results we will always assume this to hold.
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agent’s action. The fact that the intermediate good producer - or the final
goods producers depending on the particular model of this class - has market
power in its own market may have led the growth literature to adopt the logic
of patent race models with oligopolistic R&D markets (e.g. Reinganum 1983).
However, when one distinguishes between markets in which firms have the
power to influence aggregates - and hence prices - and markets in which they
cannot, the situation becomes more similar to the deterministic framework of
Gilbert and Newbury (1982)7.
However, it is interesting to observe that all the macroeconomic and com-
parative statics implications of Aghion and Howitt (1992) remain valid: inter-
estingly, the Arrow eﬀect indirectly continue to aﬀect the aggregate dynamics
in the case of drastic innovations though not showing up at the industry level.
In a steady state with constant R&D employment, nt+1 = nt = bn, and
productivity-adjusted wages, ωt+1 = ωt = bω. The equilibrium conditions
become:
L = ex(bω) + bn, (L’)
and
bω = λγπ (bω)
r + λbn (A’)
Equations (L’) and (A’) uniquely determine the steady state value of all the
endogenous variables. The steady state pair (bω, bn) can be reached immediately
in the economy of Aghion and Howitt (1992), and gives a stochastic growth
process with expected growth rate λbn log γ.
By allowing the incumbent to undertake R&D, equations (L’) and (A’)
change into:
L = ex(bω) + nO + nM , (L”)
and
bω = λγπ (bω)
r + λ (nO + nM)
, (A”)
where steady state R&D employment by outsiders, nO, and (successive) in-
cumbents, nM , are considered.
From (L") and (A") the unique steady state mass of skilled workers hired
7Obviously, not because innovation is non-stochastic, but because - unlike Reinganum’s
(1982) industry - no R&D firm perceives it can profitably modify the aggregate flow prob-
ability of the next innovation.
10
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by the competitive fringe of R&D firms would be nO = bn − nM ≥ 0, with
no change in the aggregate amount of R&D employment and therefore in the
expected growth rate.
2.3. Perfect Competitive R&D and Arrow Eﬀect
In this section - with no loss of generality - we will restrict the analysis to the
steady state. In what follows we prove that under the competitive assump-
tions of Aghion and Howitt (1992) the unique steady state has to satify the
previous equations (L") and (A"), leaving the incumbent’s participation to
R&D indetermined.
The most important question is the following: is the monopolist’s R&D
employment nM ∈ [0, bn] convenient at the equilibrium wage and prices? In a
simultaneous game such as our competitive market with externality this de-
pends on what all other market participants are doing. Let us remind that
the incumbent’s stock market value, Vt+1, is determined by the current expec-
tations about the future R&D employment levels8. Since each of an infinite
number of potential entrants has constant returns to scale their R&D labor
demand correspondence is equal to zero for wt > ωAt, to infinity if the reverse
inequality holds, and to any amount for wt = ωAt. Under perfect competi-
tion it is as if every firm’s R&D labor demand correspondence and worker’s
labor supply correspondence were simultaneously communicated to the mar-
ket maker - that is to the frictionless theoretical Walrasian auctioneer - who
would then find a wage level for which there exist a distribution of quantity de-
manded and supplied belonging to the corresponding set values of the demand
and supply correspondences, and that clear the market. Given its knowledge
of the market clearing mechanism and of the strategies of all the other mar-
ket participants, the monopolist’s best response would be to prescribe a labor
demand equal to zero for wt > ωAt and to any amount in [0, bn] for wt = ωAt.
The reason is that it recognizes that given the outsiders’ optimal strategies
and the Walrasian market mechanism it will never be able to reduce the flow
probability of its product t obsolescence for wage levels wt lower than or equal
to ωAt.
Notice that for the competitive labor market to drive wages to full em-
ployment (L’) and the perfectly competitive capital markets to exhaust all
profitable R&D investment opportunities until arbitrage condition (A’) is sat-
isfied it is not necessary that the outsiders can observe in advance the action of
8Which will directly aﬀect future obsolescence and indirectly aﬀect future monopoly
profits.
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the monopolist: the Walrasian auctioneer shall know it and re-assign outsiders’
quantities.
In such a perfectly competitive market for R&D labor with an externality
on the intermediate good monopolist the total amount of R&D labor employed
is dictated by the unique equilibrium and at the corresponding wage level the
monopolist’s net expected revenue from investing nMωAt is nMλVt+1 for all
nM ∈ [0, bn]. Hence the monopolist is as indiﬀerent as any R&D firm in its
optimal R&D investment: the identity of the R&D firms to which the real or
fictional market maker will eventually assign the R&D labor - thereby resolv-
ing the indeterminacy inherent in the constant returns framework - does not
alter aggregate obsolesce but only individual participation to the gains from
the innovative lottery. As in all competitive markets with constant returns to
scale, the size of operation by each firm is indeterminate: the market mak-
ers’ activity - stilyzed by the theoretical Walrasian auctioneer device - plays
exactly the role of assigning this scale arbitrarily without violating agents’ de-
mand/supply correspondences. Hence the incumbent cannot take other firms’
R&D quantities as given before an equilibrium is reached: it can only take
prices as given. Therefore:
Proposition 2.2. In the unique positive steady state of the basic Schum-
peterian model with drastic innovations equations (L") and (A") hold, and
the mass nM of R&D labor the incumbent intermediate good monopolist hires
in the unique steady state can be any number in [0, bn].
Corollary 2.3. Aghion and Howitt’ s (1992) macroeconomic analysis holds
with no modification in its implications about the aggregate growth rate, the
aggregate R&D employment, wages, prices, and profits, and all other aggregate
variables. Moreover, it is robust to any evidence of incumbents’ undertaking
R&D up to bn.
Notice that it is not even necessary that nM stays constant over time,
provided that it never exceed bn.
Key to understanding our result is a correct interpretation of the tricky
aspects of the perfectly competitive R&D sector assumed in the basic Schum-
peterian economy. In fact, given a real wage level the total supply of R&D
labor is given at the sectoral level; when an R&D firm demands one more flow
unit of R&D labor at the equilibrium wage its demand will be satisfied if and
only if that unit of labor does not get an alternative research job within the
same sector. Otherwise the wage rate would rise and the firm would not de-
mand it any more. Hence at the equilibrium wage an individual firm’s hiring
12
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one more R&D labor unit does not create an additional supply of R&D labor
for the whole R&D sector: it simply forces a particular allocation of a given
amount of aggregate R&D employment. But by not increasing aggregate R&D
employment in that sector it cannot increase the obsolescence of the current
incumbent. Therefore its ability to hire more of a given pool of R&D labor
only increases its own chances of making the innovation and of appropriat-
ing its fruits: this is equivalent to buying one more ticket in a lottery with a
predermined success probability.
Redistributing R&D employment across firms is like redistributing the own-
ership of the success probabilities, but the sum of these probabilities is deter-
mined only by the aggregate supply of R&D labor at the equilibrium wage.
The common argument proving the Arrow eﬀect typically says that the
incumbent by buying a marginal unit of R&D labor increases its chances of
winning the next patent race and of losing its current patent value. However,
whenever there is only one level of aggregate R&D labor employment for each
wage rate, though the incumbent’s marginal chances of being the winner really
depend on its own marginal R&D employment decision, the probability of its
current patent’s becoming obsolete only depends on the total amount of R&D
labor supplied to the sector - and pinned down by the real wage.
2.4. Is Arrow Eﬀect Anywhere?
It is useful to comment on the previous result and in particular on its rela-
tionship with the so called Arrow eﬀect. Actually, we can say that the Arrow
eﬀect is still at work, but not in the sense usually intended by the literature.
Of course, the common belief that the incumbent should do no research turns
out to be incorrect: in light of the previous analysis of the basic Schumpeterian
model, we should not be surprised to observe that in the real world the in-
cumbent monopolists do a lot of R&D and hold sequential patents. However
it is absolutely true that the aggregate variables behave as if R&D were un-
dertaken only by outsider R&D firms aiming to challenge the current product
so as to displace the current incumbent. This paper suggests that it is in this
sense that the Arrow eﬀect should be interpreted.
Moreover our result is similar in the spirit to the industrial organization
classic result on contestable markets. In fact it is the potential competition
of free entrants that suﬃces to discipline the monopolist’s R&D policy. Were
the R&D market not open to outsider firms, the monopolist would be the only
one to invest and its investment decision would internalize its business stealing.
Hence restricting entry into R&D may severely reduce R&D investment and
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innovation. However, it is important to remark that it is the potential entry
that matters for innovation. Similarly, more eﬃcient capital markets and
venture capitalists may have important beneficial eﬀects on growth even if
their activity in financing start up R&D firms is only potential.
3. Multisector Extensions
In the multisector extensions of the basic Schumpeterian model (e.g. Gross-
man and Helpman 1991a and 1991b, Segerstrom 1998, Howit 1999, Li 2003),
firm-specific R&D intensities Ii add up to the industry-wide R&D intensity I
due to the assumption that the returns to R&D intensities are independent
across firms within the same industry, across industries and over time. It is
most common to solve quality ladders models by imposing symmetric R&D ef-
forts across product lines. However this is only a simplified methodology used
when there are no decreasing returns to R&D at the sectorial level, that allow
to uniquely determine the R&D levels and therefore to solve the one period
indeterminacy inherent in these models with a linear cross-sector R&D trans-
formation function9. In such a setting the supply of R&D labor per-sector is
not uniquely pinned down by the wage rate. Therefore it is not per se incorrect
to assume that any R&D firm’s marginal hiring can aﬀect that sector’s R&D
labor. However, with a more general and realistic microfoundation leading to
a strictly concave cross-sector R&D transformation function10 our argument
applies, whenever R&D is perfectly competitive.
For example, by assuming a sectorial fixed factor that renders the single
firm’s success probability of R&D in a particular sector strictly decreasing
in the aggregate R&D in the sector - as e.g. in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom
(1999) - we can easily rule out the industrial organization implications of the
Arrow eﬀect along the lines of the previous section. More specifically, we
could express the instantaneous success probability of R&D I(ω, t) in sector
ω ∈ [0; 1] at time t > 0 as in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom’s (1999) eq. (4)
9An analysis of the growth consequences of such an indeterminacy in the quality ladders
model is provided by Cozzi (2006).
10Of course, models with a linear transformation function are as useful as more compli-
cated models in analyzing Schumpeterian growth. Hence there is no lack of generality and
realism in so long as their macroeconomic focus is concerned. What I am trying to empha-
size here is that some of their macroeconomic implications do not hold when more generality
and realism is included. Instead of weakening it, this paper shows that incumbent’s R&D
involvement shall not be taken as evidence against Schumpeterian growth theory.
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I(ω, t) ≡ ALI(ω, t)
αhI(ω, t)1−α
XI(ω, t)
where hI(ω, t) is the amount of "workers with specialized R&D skills" in
sector ω (Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 1999), and where LI(ω, t) are "workers
with general R&D skills". Alternatively, following Segerstrom et al. (1990),
we could assume a negative sectorial externality of R&D and derive the unique
steady state R&D employment level from the zero profit condition.
As the reader can easily see, these routes allow us to uniquely pin down each
sector’s R&D intensity in a formally similar way as in Aghion and Howitt’s
(1992) steady state. Of course, in their model the upward sloping aggregate
supply of R&D workers was due to general equilibrium eﬀects through man-
ufacturing decreasing marginal returns to skilled labor, whereas here it is the
general-skill R&D labor aggregate demand that slopes down due to partial
equilibrium eﬀects (decreasing returns in own sector’s R&D). However, given
the individual firms’ infinitely elastic labor demands at the wage rate solving
the arbitrage condition any R&D firm’s - including the incumbent manufactur-
ing firm’s - marginal decision to hire general-skill R&D labor cannot increase
its total employment in the sector. More employment by any firm can only be
coupled with less employment by other firms, but never with more employment
by the whole.
With non-drastic innovations in a Grossman and Helpman’ s (1991a and
b) economy, the quality advantage (which determines prices) of a leader who
innovated twice may not become λ2 because "potential entrants can, via in-
spection of the goods on the market, learn enough about the state of knowledge
to mount their own research eﬀorts, even if the patent laws [...] prevent them
from manufacturing the current generation products" (Grossman and Help-
man 1991a, p. 47). Alternatively, as often assumed, the previous leading-edge
technology becomes prior knowledge and the patent on this technology ex-
pires. In both cases the quality diﬀerence between the leader and the followers
is given by λ, i.e. by the size of one innovation. Thus, product prices and
monopoly profits do not change.
4. Conclusions
In this paper I have shown that there is no reason to expect that the Schum-
peterian growth model with vertical innovations imply that the monopolist
firm or its shareholders should not undertake R&D. This contrasts the tradi-
tional interpretation of the Arrow eﬀect, though the Arrow eﬀect is vindicated
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at the macroeconomic level. In this sense the existing empirical evidence of
sequential patenting by the same firms or individuals should not be taken as
evidence against the basic Schumpeterian growth theory.
The usual empirical critique to the Schumpeterian models of quality lad-
ders crucially hinges on an interpretation of their R&D sector that employs
a peculiar game-theoretic model of investment (e.g., each firm chooses its in-
vestment, taking that of its rivals as given). Thus each firm has a small but
positive impact on aggregate investment; in this case, the incumbent invests
nothing. This impact becomes increasingly small as the number of firms grows,
but the limit is taken along this equilibrium path, where the incumbent in-
vests zero for each value of n. Instead by literally following the Schumpeterian
model’s explicit assumption of perfectly competitive R&D, it is correct to say
that a perfectly-competitive model yields an indeterminate investment for the
incumbent, thereby predicting that incumbents should invest randomly.
The quantity game interpretation of the perfectly competitive R&D as-
sumption may have been inspired by an analogy with the classic industrial
organization’s statement11 that as the number of firms in a Cournot oligopoly
tends to infinity, with each firm’s market share tending to zero, the equilib-
rium price tends to the perfectly competitive equilibrium price. However, this
quantitative coincidence does not mean that Cournot behavior (i.e. quantity
taking behavior) is the same as the perfectly competitive (i.e. price taking)
behavior: when the Schumpeterian models explicitly assume that R&D is per-
fectly competitive they are not conceiving of R&D being carried out by a lot
of Cournot competitors, which renders quantity game equilibrium limit argu-
ments not only mis-leading but inappropriate.
Are incumbent monopolists ‘small’ firms? This is left to empirical stud-
ies, which can confirm or reject this hypothesis depending on time, sector or
country. Since this paper’s arguments are not restricted to the assumption
that industry leaders are small - namely, size does not matter in our propo-
sitions just because equilibrium R&D firm size is indeterminate - I hope to
have clarified that the original Schumpeterian theory cannot be contradicted
empirically also on these grounds, but that instead it was consistent from
its very beginning with incumbents either doing little R&D or a lot of R&D
aimed at cannibalizing their own patent portfolios. The reason why the in-
cumbents can be doing any amount of R&D from zero to the potentially very
large amount we would expect the outsider actual and potential entrants to
the research sector to carry out is that the perfectly competitive market clear-
ing mechanism and the private CRS R&D technology renders the incumbent’s
11Tirole (1988, p. 220-221) and Motta (2004, p. 559).
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R&D decision uninfluential for extending her patent’s expected life. Free en-
try and constant returns to scale, as is well known in IO, are consistent both
with quantity and price competition. The empirical implication of quantity
competition are known (Barro and Sala-I-Martin 2004), whereas those of price
competition are shown in this paper. The controversial interpretation of the
basic Schumpeterian theory stems from its initially stated assumption (price
competition in the R&D) and its derivation in terms of quantity competition.
The available empirical evidence does not falsify the interpretation in terms of
price competition.
I wish to emphasize that such an acquittal12 of the original Schumpeterian
theory13 does not preclude new explanations, and in a sense this long period
of misunderstanding of its original properties had the virtue of stimulating
the researchers to explore potentially useful alternatives to the assumption
of free entry into a simultaneous R&D activities by outsiders having equal
opportunities. For example, once one observes empirically14 that incumbents
are not small, and brings enough evidence that it be more realistic to assume
that the quality leader has some market power also in the R&D market and
thus can act as a Stackelberg leader in its own industry, then, we will find
the models of Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, Denicolò, 2001, Etro (2004), and
Segerstrom (2006) more appropriate.
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